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THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR:

VALID YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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25 May 2005

Abstract

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR :

VALID YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW

The principles of war have survived for many years and have assisted many military planners and commanders. They do not exist as a cookbook solution to generate success, but they do exist as a guide to energize the thought process of planners and commanders. When the concepts are employed in an artful, skillful, and knowledgeable manner, one may possibly have a greater potential for success.

These principles are not axiomatically immutable nor were they designed to be. They are based on an in-depth study of war along with personal experiences of the original authors. They have received many critical analyses and have thus far survived. It is prudent; however, that these types of critical analyses continue, especially today as the military and the nation applies the rapid changes in technology.

This paper will show that the principles do not need to be changed. Through the analysis of recent historical examples and of arguments by others that support changes to the existing principles, it becomes evident the need for change is in the manner in which they are viewed.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Different groups addressing the possible need for changes as today's military continues its transformation process have debated the principles of war. Transformation has become an issue that consumes many hours as groups attempt to show how a product or method assists transformational efforts. However, no one should change existing, proven, methods without first conducting a thorough analysis to justifying changes. An analysis of the principles of war reveals they are germane for today's military and political leaders just as they were over sixty years ago. The principles do not require changes as the military transforms to maximize use of modern technology. The manner that they are thought of must change to understand how new technology can enhance the tried and proven principles of war.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Joint Publication 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*

Mass

Maneuver

Objective

Offensive

Simplicity

Surprise

Economy of Force

Unity of Command

Security

The principles of war as articulated in doctrinal manuals today have endured for over eighty years. Withstanding the test of time over several wars is a feat that lends one to believe that the given principles are here to stay. Nevertheless, they are worthy of research to determine if they remain current or whether changes are necessary. This process of examination is not new for research shows the military profession as well as other academics has debated the worthiness of the principles. In many ways, the manner the principles are discussed today is very similar to the manner that Rear Admiral Brown described in 1949 when he stated, “the attitude varies from the worshipful approach of the cultist who regards the principles of war as basic and immutable to the complete rejection of one who said: ‘The science of war is so obscure and imperfect that its sole foundations and support are prejudice confirmed by ignorance,’ and the other who snorted: ‘Principles are just a lot of substantives!’” (Brown, 621) The noteworthy efforts of the original articulators have ensured the principles continue to endure as technology impacts the way war is waged.

Warfare has changed with technological increases. The manner wars are conducted or fought has changed dramatically from the phalanx in the early years of organized military maneuvers to the use of nuclear weapons in the past sixty years. The last several years mankind has witnessed tremendous technological advancements in areas such as personal and mainframe computers, silicone computer capabilities, precision guided munitions, satellite positioning, satellite imagery, and tremendous technological advances in the communication field. These changes have created new instruments of warfare that have an impact on how the military forces organize, train, and fight wars. From the time that President Truman decided to use the atomic

bomb against the Japanese, the United States has attempted to use atomic and nuclear power to dissuade and persuade different nations and nation states to cooperate in varying situations. Strategies such as massive retaliation and flexible response have been used but have failed to persuade all adversaries to cooperate with the desires of the United States. The massive technological capabilities of the United States have failed to prevent the use of military personnel in hostile situations. Regardless of the nomenclature given to an incident involving the military, men and women have given their lives and others have made sacrifices in various ways to execute the political desires of the United States. These sacrifices have occurred as the technological advancements continue. Nevertheless, the principles of war have endured all technological changes. This shows tremendous foresight and understanding of the conduct of war by the originator.

Many different debates have occurred and some continue today concerning the relativity of the current principles. However, even as the advances in technology work to change the conduct of war, the principles remain germane. Some will describe the principles as being immutable, but this description is too strong. It is necessary and healthy to examine the given principles regularly to substantiate their relativity, and changes should be made if deemed appropriate based upon examination and reason. Many discussions concerning the principles reflect that they may be too abstract. So abstract that they can be applied to any situation if one is gifted in the use of the English language. However, Fuller states that all theoretical systems of war must be sufficiently flexible in nature that they can be easily molded to whatever circumstances confront a general. (Fuller p. 185) Military leaders and military planners are taught these principles very early in their careers. They become ingrained in the manner career servicemen

execute their duties for everything from operations other than war to what has become the conventional method of waging war. It is a positive attribute of the principles that their concepts can be used in many different situations.

Not only are the principles important to all members of the service, the nation's political leadership will be well served as they develop a firm understanding of these principles. For instance, if the political leadership during the Vietnam War had a firm understanding of the principle of mass then the idea of gradual response would have been seen as the improper way to conduct the war. This issue will be discussed in more detail as the principle of mass is analyzed.

It is important however to understand that the nine principles are not prerequisites for the nation to go to war or for a military unit to conduct a tactical engagement with the enemy. They exist to act as a guide to entice strategic, operational, and tactical leaders to consider certain concepts before waging war or fighting battles. These concepts may work harmoniously to assist one in gaining success. Users of the principles must develop a solid foundation on how the principles are interrelated. Prudent measures must be taken to address all principles with the knowledge that when conditions do not allow a principle to be met, the user must evaluate the risk involved if one is to continue the actions. It is similar to how one must understand the workings of a compass. It is common knowledge that the needle of the compass will point to true north and if one follows the arrow, one will generally walk in a northerly direction. However, the needle will point toward any magnetic object that is placed near the compass. So if one is taking a reading from a compass that may be obstructed by another metallic object, one will not receive a true reading. It is important that the user understands how the compass works

and how outside factors may impact its function. The same is true with the principles of war. The user must understand their interrelations and also be aware of what the circumstances are if one or more of the principles may not be met. Simultaneously, it is important to understand the principles are a guide and not a cookbook solution to ensure victory or success on the battlefield or in a nation building environment. Therefore, not meeting one principle does not equate to failure nor does meeting all the principles guarantee success.

The research presented in this paper is divided into three main sections beginning with chapter two. Chapter two discusses the history of the principles. The history reveals that much thought and consideration revolving around personal experiences and a detailed study of past wars contributed to the development of the principles as they exist today. Many debates occurred and several changes were made before the nine became readily acceptable. The fact that these nine have endured supports the idea that the originators had a well grounded knowledge and understanding of the unchanging nature of war.

Chapter three discusses the need to maintain the principles of war. These principles will no longer be necessary if war becomes obsolete. This chapter discusses the reasons the United States may go to war and the type of wars that may be incurred. The National Security Strategy assists the military and the nation to prepare for potential conflicts and this strategy has not fundamentally changed in the past sixty years. The National Security Strategy drives the development of the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. Allowing that there have been only small changes fundamentally, it should not be unreasonable to believe why the traditional principles of war have endured over the years.

The nation will continue to be involved in future wars and the National Security Strategy will continue to potentially drive where and when we will engage. As the world's current sole superpower, the United States has the power to determine the conduct of future wars but limiting factors include international laws, political objectives, and the will of the people. The will of the people to accept death and destruction for both friendly and enemy forces will be a factor in determining how the nation will fight its wars. The United States should therefore take the lead in discussions surrounding the principles of war and work to promulgate them worldwide for other nations to use. The reason this becomes increasingly important is the nation's desire to fight future wars in a combined joint environment using coalitions and alliances.

The third section is in Chapter four which discusses each of the nine principles of war. It analyses how each principle has been used in recent conflicts, discusses views critical to the validity of the principle, and discusses reasons they may remain valid for today and the future. The definitions that are used in this chapter for each of the principles are found in Joint Publication 3-0. The joint definition is used because although the United States is willing to exercise the right to act unilaterally, the desire remains to share the responsibilities of maintaining stability throughout the world with other countries. The current National Security Strategy (NSS) addresses this issue as it discusses the need to work with others to defuse regional conflicts. Specifically the NSS states: "In an increasingly interconnected world, regional crisis can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability." (Bush, 9)

The analysis is intended to demonstrate that the principles either remain relevant or they do not. The traditional principles have received much thought and critique over the years and past examinations reveal they have been developed as a theoretical system of war whose flexibility is such that they can be applied to any situation a military serviceman, or political strategist, may confront. (Fuller, *Generalship*, 185) Research will reveal if this idea remains valid today.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

The nine principles of war have been presented to entry-level servicemen and women for the last several decades. Recruits, cadets, midshipmen, officer candidates, and others often memorized these principles using an acronym such as MOOSE MUSS or MOSS MOUSE. They do this in preparation for exam questions or to show that one has studied their military knowledge while preparing for a personnel inspection.

Too often, the student gives little thought to the origin of the principles. They believe the principles are correct because a person of competent authority presented them. As the student of the principles progresses in their careers, these principles may be used as a guide to assist in the planning of a tactical exercise, or planning at the operational or strategic level. The user may not have developed any type of mental checklist to ensure all nine principles are addressed during the development phase or the execution phase of these plans, but because they have received these principles from the beginning of their military careers, they used them in an almost automatic manner. The user considers concepts such as mass, economy of force, surprise, unity of command, etc. all subsets of the principles of war, without much effort.

One may consider the comments made by a senior officer who was the successful leader of a United States' military campaign in the late 1980's. The study of his campaign clearly demonstrated the careful and successful employment of several of the traditional principles of war. However, when asked if he used a mental checklist to ensure the principles had been addressed, he responded in the negative. Proper education on these principles ensures they are used with considerable ease.

To understand the thought and considerations given to this subject, one can begin with the word principle itself. Many different words have been used that can be considered synonymous with principle. They include axiom, law, rule, guide, fundamental, essence, maxim, lesson, aphorism, and doctrine. (Alger, xxiii) Using the acceptable definition for principles as a fundamental truth that is professed as a guide to action, one will see that all of the terms listed above are associated with the history of the modern concept of principles of war and can be considered a principle according to this acceptable definition. (Alger, xxiii) This may seem readily acceptable, but in Admiral Brown's article from 1949, he addresses their use.

He did not agree with the words fundamental truth and chose to use fundamental assumptions. (Brown, 623) This may have been to accept the fact that all do not agree with the principles as taught. Brown made a point to say that the principles are not immutable, thereby supporting the idea that they are fundamental assumptions and not fundamental truths. One would assume that if each principle was a fundamental truth, each would need to be met in order to be successful on any battlefield. This simply is not the case. As discussed and as Admiral Brown stated over 55 years ago, the principles are an aid to be used by those who are students of war to grasp the essentials of a difficult art. (Brown, 623) They are therefore fundamental assumptions based on extensive studies of past wars. And, as this paper intends to show, they are not immutable – at least the concepts associated with each of the principles may vary as technology changes the way war is waged. This is not to argue that any of the nine needs to be changed at this time, but again the nine should be analyzed and changed, if necessary, based on valid reason. The formulation of the principles of war has been extremely volatile.

There is one fundamental question that many ask when conducting a detail study of the principles of war: Do they exist? (Leonhard, 265) The next question, should one answer yes to this first, is: why do they exist? First the study of the principles show that there are numerous renowned writers and thinkers who do not believe there should be a succinct list of principles that pertains to war. Their thoughts generally surround the idea that each war is different and will require different approaches to achieve success. Mao Tse-tung, founder of the People's Republic of China, insisted that each war is different, and that any military professional attempting to import lessons learned from a past war to a future war would be making a capital mistake. Mao believed that the factors conditioning each conflict are completely different and therefore must be fought in a different manner. (Leonhard, 266)

Mao's thought remains important for today's warriors also. All too often those in the military hear that the military trains to fight the last war. Force must be appropriate to the environment in which it operates: social, weather, terrain, etc. There are certainly many differences in the employment and maintenance of equipment among other things in these environments and the military leaders must be prepared for such issues. However, the principles as they are presented in modern times provide ideas, or a starting base, for military leaders to consider when preparing for war in either environment. The method of using the principle of mass in an arid or humid command will be of little difference. The same is true with the use of the principle of unity of command. Regardless of how the environment may change, how tactics may change, or how technology may change, the student who studies and understands the principles and their concepts will see the need to address their meanings in a war situation to ensure success.

Mao is not alone in his disagreements that such principles should or could exist. Moltke the Elder, chief of the Prussian general staff from 1858 through 1888, resisted the school of thought that espoused military principles. As a leader of the German state during the Wars of German Unification, Moltke and his staff aggressively attacked the military problems of his day, and he rejected the proposition that there were general rules that could govern military practice. (Leonhard, 266)

In more modern times, Bernard Brodie, a well-respected strategist from the Rand Corporation, has argued and has presented lectures against any service teaching the principles of war. Brodie's lectures did not argue the existence of the principles, but he did argue against the principles being reduced to one-word bullets. He felt it to be a shortcoming to insinuate that the principles of war, as conflicting and confusing as war is, could be reduced to learning only nine single words or aphorisms. Brodie's perception on the principles of war was that past writers saw them as a well understood commonly accepted philosophy that could be used to assist in developing strategy. The problem as he saw it was that these principles had now been reduced to a specific body of axioms. Brodie characterized the modern age as one which uses condensation as a way of life, but the principles of war are too condensed. (Leonhard, 269-270)

Brodie's concern was that this simplification of the principles of war would stifle the ability to think critically by those who are students of warfare. The simplification of the principles of war into single words made the students become too respectful of them, yet simultaneously, the words were too abstract and too devoid of content. In a lecture at the Command and General Staff College in 1956, Brodie suggested to the students that they consider the principles of war

like the titles of chapters in a book. By themselves, these titles were of little use, the students gained useful knowledge only by reading the chapters. The words then became useful to remind one what the chapters said. (Leonhard, 270)

Brodie's teaching approach is useful today also. If one is only able to recite the nine principles of war they will be of little use. Military professionals need to be well aware of the meaning of these words and to realize the continued study of these principles will assist all to be successful in a time of war.

There will continue to be those who argue against the principles, who will agree with the thoughts of Mao in that wars are too different, too complex, for one to generate a set of governing principles. From this viewpoint, one can deduce that no civilization or culture is able to learn any valuable lessons, or derive any stable truths from past military events. (Leonhard, 266) There are other theorist and notable warriors who do not subscribe to such beliefs.

It is generally acceptable that wars are different. They are fought in different places, different climates, with different weapons, tactics, and procedures and against different opponents. In the war fought to free Kuwait of Hussein's invaders from Iraq, the Allied force, although considered small by some, numbered more than the maximum number of forces Napoleon had on any battlefield. And when one considers the availability of firepower that General Schwarzkopf's forces had available, they could essentially attack any part of the enemy's homeland that they desired. The forces did not have a limitation on the ranges of their weapons for conceivably; any target they desired to engage could be struck with air or artillery weapon systems. The television

newscasts could display and provide much information to the military leaders on both sides. The leaders essentially could view any part of the battle on television. An infantry battalion had more available firepower than Napoleon's entire Grande Armee of 1812. Napoleon had foot soldiers, horses, carriages, and all had to be rested frequently. The units under Schwarzkopf traveled in powerful humvees, large trucks and tanks weighing hundreds of tons. They could use helicopters and self propelled artillery. All of this modern equipment did not necessarily equate to an easy job for the General. Schwarzkopf's front extended over 600 miles compared to a front that Napoleon might have used of only five miles. He had to conduct a holding action while maneuvering other units several hundred miles away. (Connelly, 7) With the differences such as listed here, one may be led to accept that it is not conceivable that a set of principles could be developed. However, with increasing modernization, the nature of the war did not change. Each leader had to employ available forces and use available equipment and take the offensive to maneuver their assets in order to mass men, equipment, and the effects of such forces to achieve their objectives. Both individual forces had the same overarching objective of enforcing their will upon another.

When one ponders the question of the existence of the principles of war against the perceived changes, one must understand the complexity of war itself. For war has several contexts with the most prominent being political, social, cultural, and technological. Wars do not happen in a vacuum and it is important when discussing how war changes not to treat war as an autonomous phenomenon. During any period of history, warfare has been shaped and driven much more by the political, social, and strategic contexts, than it is by changes integral to military science. (Gray, 2-3)

The unchanging military science of war supports the existence of a set of principles of war. A set of concepts that guides warriors as they apply the science of warfare to achieve their will upon another can exist because the very nature of war (human nature) as described here is unchanging.

Whatever about warfare is changing, it is not, and cannot be, its very nature. If war's nature were to alter, it would become something else. The nature of war in the twenty-first century is the same as it was in the twentieth, the nineteenth, and indeed, in the fifth century BC. In all of its more important, truly defining features, the nature of war is eternal. No matter how profound a military transformation may be, and strategic history records many such, it must work with a subject that it cannot redefine. (Gray, 5-6)

There are other theorists that support the unchanging nature of war. Just as many receive instructions on the existing principles of war, they also receive instructions based on the teachings of theorist such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu concerning the conditions of war. Clausewitz describes all wars as entities of the same nature. (Clausewitz, 606) He continues by saying there are two natures of war, subjective and objective with objective being permanent and subjective being subject to frequent changes. (Clausewitz, 85) Clausewitz also discusses several elements of war that he describes as being permanent. These elements are danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance. (Clausewitz 104) He explains, "war, though conditioned by the particular characteristics of states and their armed forces, must contain some more general – indeed a universal element that with which every theorist ought above all to be concerned." (Clausewitz, 593) One can see from this that the reasons a state or a party may go to war will differ, but there are permanent characteristics that exist in every war. Studies of past wars can and do provide insights on what operations one must do to be successful in the next. This is not to say that the results of such studies will produce principles that when applied, will always

produce success. The reason behind this is, as Clausewitz describes, friction. The best develop plans will hardly ever consider every possible action that may take place. But by having a set of principles that were developed through the study of the unchanging nature of war will certainly provide an acceptable guide for military planners and commanders to use during a time of conflict. One will see through a study of the nine traditional principles of war that each, through an artful implementation, will assist the warriors as they address the permanent elements of war – danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance. With these arguments, it is difficult to conceive how anyone could argue that there exist such differences in wars that no sustaining set of principles could exist.

Leonhard uses the analogy of raising children. Parents can appreciate the uniqueness of each of their children, but they can certainly apply certain experiences from one to the other as they are raised. In this sense, it is easy to see how other theorists who have studied past wars were able to uncover a body of truth about war that can be learned and put to some use. (Leonhard, 267)

The historian, Connelly, uses the modern day military leader, George Patton, to provide an example of why theorists are able to develop an enduring set of principles of war.

The primary function of war has not within historic time been materially changed by the advent of new weapons. The unchanging principle of combat is to inflict on the enemy the maximum amount of wounds and death in a minimum of time and as cheaply as possible. If future leaders will remember that nothing is impossible, that casualties received from enemy action in battle are a function of time and effective enemy fire, and that any type of troops can fight any place, they will not go wrong. (Connelly, 132)

It is clear that through the detailed study of past wars one can determine a set of principles. Just as it is possible to learn from the past and to develop guides that one can use to be successful in the future. These principles are based on the elements that are observed as being useful to overcome the permanent elements that are used to describe the unchanging objective nature of war. That is the main reason for their existence and the most important reason why the warriors of today and tomorrow must study them. But now that one understands the argument that the principles can and do exist, it is important to see how they were developed or codified for use in the United States.

The theorists who conceptualized the current principles of war began to see these fundamental truths around the time of the Napoleonic era. Fuller, a British General officer, did much work in the early 1900's to codify the principles for his country. Fuller initiated his quest to codify a set of principles after studying the Field Service Regulations (1909 edition) as preparation for a war he believed was soon to break out in Europe. During his studies he came upon a quote that remains applicable today.

The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult, and cannot be made subject to rules. The correct application of principles to circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice until it has become an instinct. (Fuller, 13)

This information appeared informative and rather logical to Fuller, but the problem was the manual never articulated them. It left the reader to guess what it considered to be the principles of war. This led Fuller to begin his quest to identify a set of principles of war maintaining the understanding that they must be kept to the absolute minimum and not become so burdensome or complex that they would not be useful to those who would come to employ them. Fuller chose

to study Napoleon closely to determine the principles. It would take over twelve years that encompassed at least one war, much more research, and numerous lectures and debates concerning the principles. Fuller went from six in 1912 to eight in 1915, to nineteen in 1923. Then, in keeping with the original manual directing that they not become too numerous, the number descended to nine in 1925. He reduced these nine into three groups: principles of control, resistance, and pressure. He reduced these three groups into one law: the law of economy of force. (Fuller, 16)

Interesting is that many opponents of a set of principles state that the word principles implies a scientific approach to war. These objectors believe that war maintains more of an art form largely because of so many uncertainties in war. In science, one knows that if chemical x is mixed with chemical “y” one will produce result “z” all the time. Repeating the same action during war will hardly ever produce the same result. Fuller also believed in the artist approach but he felt that to become a true artist of war military students must think of war scientifically. He believed soldiers needed to realize what civil science meant. (Fuller, 16) Fuller knew he was one of the first to approach war from a scientific view point, but he supported his goal of providing a study so that all could begin to understand the nature of war, and learn not only how to prepare for it, but how to restrict its ugliness. (Fuller, 18)

The reader of Fuller’s book, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, will see that he covers in great detail how he decided upon the nine principles. His thorough understanding of man’s psyche and complete review of military history led to his insightful and enduring list of principles. These principles do not stand as individuals and a warrior would be wrong today to

consider employing a principle as a sole element without considering how the others are affected. Fuller had the same belief. Warriors obviously will not have time to consider the principles in a methodical manner so it is important that they are trained to understand how one principle impacts on another. “As conditions change, he applies them, and the quicker he can do so the higher will be his initiative ... This is economy of force observed, and each small economy affected adds to the ultimate victory, or minimizes the ultimate defeat.” (Fuller 229) Modern day military leaders of the United States have held similar beliefs as they have maintained the list of principles in the military doctrinal manuals.

Today in the United States military, the men and women study the nine principles that are often referred to as the nine traditional principles. Traditional is used to describe the fact that they have now been in existence for over seventy years. These nine received much debate and many criticisms throughout the years. Writers of military doctrine have included them in doctrinal manuals, deleted them from the manuals, and then placed them again in the manuals. There have been numerous recommended changes, deletions, and additions, but throughout it all, the nine principles including objective, mass, maneuver, offensive, security, simplicity, surprise, economy of force, and unity of command have endured.

These nine principles have been used by the United States military in two major conflicts over the past fourteen years. And the United States has enjoyed overwhelming success in both. This is not to say that the principles of war are the sole reason for such success, but it is hard to argue that they were not partly the cause of success. Military leaders today have studied the principles and are able to apply them as Fuller envisioned. The planners and leaders of military units do

not maintain a checklist to ensure they address each principle, but they apply them based on the conditions they face. In doing so, they maintain the momentum, the initiative as Fuller has described.

It is difficult to imagine that one is not able to see how studying the science of war can lead to the development of much better artists of war. Handel provides an acceptable correlation between studying the science and art of a subject.

Just as an exact science cannot progress without the benefit of some artistic, creative elements, the 'practical' pursuit of an art (e.g., that of warfare) may contain or be based on 'discrete' scientific theories. Each discipline therefore combines, in varying degrees, the interwoven and inseparable elements of art and science. Therefore, although the practice of war is more an art than a science, this does not mean that it cannot be studied systematically or that some scientific methods cannot be applied to non-scientific disciplines (e.g., psychology, economics, political science, war). (Handel, 29)

Through the consideration of arguments for and against the principles, one may determine if the principles are real and needed to assist in presenting a logical thought pattern to an otherwise chaotic process. It is important to understand that these nine are based on a thorough study of military history along with some understanding of how man acts in the face of danger and adversity while conducting such a review.

The principles need to receive healthy debates regularly to maintain their validity. It should neither be easy nor impossible to make changes to the principles, but one must understand that changing one will undoubtedly have an impact on others. Just as adding or deleting one will have similar consequences. Therefore, it is important to debate possible changes thoroughly. This paper will discuss each of the nine showing how they have been applied at different levels and in different places. But first, now that the question of validity is answered, one must ask if

they are needed. Not needed as they apply to one's ability to successfully wage war, but will they be needed if no one believes there will be another war? If one determines war has become a historical event, then there will be no need for debates over such principles. The next chapter will analyze this issue closer.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FUTURE HAS A NEED FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Based on the research, war is inevitable. In order to justify continued discussions and debates on concepts such as the principles of war, one should first determine the need to do so. In other words, if war has become obsolete, the need for the principles would no longer exist. Many scholars have studied the meaning of war and have arrived at several different conclusions. In the end, man's animalistic and political nature will ensure there will be wars in the future. The characteristics of this inevitable war, just as the strategy of the United States, are fundamentally unchanging. Man will compete against one another using all available technology to kill or destroy the other's will to fight in order to extend their political ends.

The idea that it is man's animalistic nature that makes them go to war dates back many years. But to better understand this argument in modern times, one can make inferences from the observations of children at a playground. No one necessarily has taught them how to fight, how to throw a punch or kick someone, nevertheless, a confrontation will inevitably occur when a situation does not happen as desired by one child. This is potentially harmless by nature, but the idea is again that it is man's nature to fight. This is not to say they act barbaric in nature because, just as many governments do today, parents tend to teach their children to be slow to anger. Nevertheless, the fights or conflicts occur. Many who attest to this type of belief, that war is inevitable because of man's animalistic nature, are very familiar with the teaching of Plato that only the dead has seen the last of war. There are those who disagree with this and they have developed different ideas.

Another belief is that war is man's invention. Conflict is a needless episode of violent actions that could be avoided if one would simply choose to do so. Reasons for choosing to wage war vary, but one view taken by James Hillman is that man chooses to wage war simply because they love it. Hillman refers to a line from the film covering the life of a well renowned General, General Patton, in the movie *Patton*. In the scene Patton takes up a dying officer, kisses him, surveys the havoc, and says: "I love it. God help me I do love it so. I love it more than my life." (Hillman, 1) Of course in this scene the General is discussing his love for war. This particular manner of thought is not so far from being completely understood when one considers the statement by another famous military officer, General Robert E. Lee. In a letter to General Longstreet following the battle of Fredericksburg, Lee writes, "It is well that war is so terrible – we would grow too fond of it." (Heinl, 347)

Hillman continues to discuss man's love for war and brings to light some worthy observations about taking a sympathetic approach to understanding why one goes to war. He describes war as being a psychological task because war threatens lives and to some extent, when considering a nuclear war, it threatens the very existence of man. He describes an additional reason for this thought when he discusses how neither those who study theology or philosophy, the fields that are suppose to do the major thinking for the species, have provided any considerable thought on war's overriding importance. This supports the idea that the first principle of psychological method holds that any phenomenon to be understood must be sympathetically imagined. (Hillman, 2) Understanding this line of thought one can see how a person could become emotional about a subject such as war. But it appears that no modern day major western philosopher has exhibited sufficient emotion to write about the causes of war. Many have

written about peace which some will argue should be the sole objective of a war, but other than writings on subjects such as aggression, predation, genetic competition, and violence, pack, mob, and crowd behavior, there exist little modern writing on why humans go to war. (Hillman, 3)

It is important to note that the psychological emotions discussed here are also present in the discussions concerning the principles of war. As discussed, Fuller did not simply use his studies and experiences of war to produce the first principles. Many heated debates and essays occurred before any principles were accepted to be included in doctrinal beliefs. This is important to remember as many continue to argue their validity. These knowledgeable discussions that occurred during the embryonic stages of the principles of war work to support their existence today. It shows the principles that the theorist chose took considerable effort, research, and thought before being codified. The same is needed today before one makes any changes to the existing principles. This existence of the principles is required because war will inevitably occur again.

It will occur again because life is not fair to all. There are those who are born into wealth and there are those born into poverty. And as the ability for information to flow from one source to the next continues to grow, those that have little learn more about those who are considered wealthy. And because of this, and other reasons, war will continue.

Those who consider themselves wealthy will at times be the catalysts for conflict. One can consider Hitler's quest to eradicate the complete Jewish race only because of the belief that his race was superior. And to make the world a better place to live, Hitler decided only the members

of the superior race should exist. His attempt to conquer and spread this ideology throughout most of the world was stopped only by a World War.

There are other conflicts that start by those who consider themselves less wealthy than another. They feel as if they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by participating in some type of conflict. This can be traced back to the origin of man. One may have had more fortune at finding food while another did not. The man without picks up a stone or a stick and strikes the man with the food out of the need to survive. In this sense only the strong survives. The civilization that desires what another has will undoubtedly become hostile to achieve what is coveted. This is the animal instinct that many theorists discuss.

Man did not invent conflict, but man evolved conflict. From the first use of a rock or stick as a weapon, man has continued to search for more efficient and lethal methods to destroy one another. Man learned also that the ability to survive increased when many worked together as one. These methods lead to the development of tribes, social organizations, and organized civilizations with laws and political systems. This is where the idea that man invented war, not conflict nor fighting, begins to become believable.

Wright supports the idea that war could not exist in the sociological sense before the emergence of human societies, permanently constituted through communication by language and the accumulation of traditions. (Wright, 24) He continues to describe the growth of superegos similar to what one could consider Hitler to have. The grouping of humans by common traditions, beliefs, or customs acted as the catalyst for morals, and they generated a conscience in

the individual and the possibility of belligerent behavior in response not to organic drives but to tribal mores, to the demands of the superego. (Wright, 24) Now that mankind has developed into civilizations that are often fueled by leaders with superegos it could only justify the legality of permitting groups to expand wealth and power through violence and the development of the concept of war. War has become, as Wright states, institutionalized as a rational means to political and economic ends.

War as a legitimate procedure for acquiring territory, cattle, slaves, and political prestige has existed among civilized peoples and has been transmitted by them to their more primitive neighbors. Only among civilized people has war been an institution serving political and economic interests of the community, defined by a body of law which states the circumstances justifying its use, the procedures whereby it is begun and ended, and the methods by which it is conducted. (Wright, 25)

One now understands that war evolved from man's animalistic nature to survive through the abilities of man to develop organized civilizations. As one follows the arguments presented thus far, the ability to understand why war is inevitable becomes clearer. First, man continues to maintain a strong desire to survive. When a civilization's ability to survive becomes threatened then that group of people will inevitably resort to some type of conflict which history has shown to be most likely some type of armed conflict. This is war. Second, man is by nature a political creature. Aristotle realized this long ago and history reflects his sentiments by remembering his famous statement: *anthropos phusei politikon zoon*- "man is by nature a political animal." (Hillman, 40) As Hillman states, "We are endowed with a political instinct; politics comes with our animal nature." (Hillman, 40)

Man will not refuse to go to war today, nor will man refuse to go to war in the future. It is in the nature of man either through the animal instinct that exists naturally, or through the political

animal that exists in civilizations. As time continues, the act of going to war will be debated and considered thoroughly before a civilization actually condones the act. Just as many parents teach their children to be slow to anger, civilizations with political leaders are prudent to use a similar approach to waging war. Man has used technology to progress in tremendous strides from the days of using sticks and rocks to inflict harm. The efficiency of destroying people and objects is unlike ever before. Resorting to war has tended to become a matter of concern to all governments, and consequently the use of this technique must be justified in terms of the world-order, whether to sanction the status quo or to effect revisions deemed to be desirable. Wright states “Animals have fought from inherited drives, primitive men from group custom, people of historic civilization for group interests, but people of contemporary world-civilization fight for what they deem to be a better world-order.” (Wright, 25)

A better-world order is an objective that many different civilizations desire. It readily supports the concept for a principle of war that is readily viewed as the most important one – the principle of objective. It is this objective, to make the world a better place to live, that causes much consternation among different people. The United States has decided to fight a war in Afghanistan and in Iraq with the overall objective of making the world a safer place, a safer place for democracy to grow. However, the enemy the United States fights believes to some extent that to create a better world-order is to destroy the western way of life. They believe that the western way is riddled with immorality, injustice, and is satanic in nature.

The war in the end, looks more like the United States is promoting regional stability in order to ensure free market trade progresses fruitfully through the uninterrupted flow of oil. Also

involved in this war is the idea of keeping the American way of life safe from terrorist attacks and the possibility of an attack using weapons of mass destruction by a man considered to be too unstable to lead a country.

It looks like a war against those who have and those who have not. The United States has a way of life that looks wealthy and inviting and to maintain this for today and posterity, regional stability is needed in the gulf region. The “have-nots” see the United States as being selfish, uncaring about their needs and beliefs and have little desire to capitulate to the American or western way of life. In actuality it is much deeper than what has just been described. Thomas Barnett describes that as globalization continues there are those who are among the core of the progress and there are those in the gap. If one should fall off the bandwagon of globalization then war is certain to follow. The United States must continue to be prepared for such events by being prepared for war. Thus the principles of war appear to continue to remain relevant. One will gain a deeper understanding of the potential conflicts and the need for the principles by further discussing Barnett’s idea of core and gap.

There is more to globalization than simply labeling one as either in the have or have-not categories. That is why Barnett’s idea surrounding cores and gaps is so intriguing. His arguments provide military leaders ideas about the type of future conflicts and provide a good idea of the entities the United States may face in the future. Barnett’s core and gap thesis shows how the disconnectedness of a gap member defines the danger. He describes Hussein’s outlaw regime as dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its norms, and all the ties that bind countries together in mutually assured dependence. (Barnett, 1) Notice he

does not mention religion as a subject that determines a subject's disconnectedness. Each culture or civilization needs to decide upon their norms or their rule sets. An acceptable manner to understand the norm that the United States accepts is to review the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. They espouse the norm as the nation's desire to spread freedom throughout the world, to promote democracy for all, and to ensure the wealth and prosperity for the current population and for posterity. This leads one to believe that the norms tend to lean toward societies that do not limit its people's ability to thrive. The norm will allow its societies to make decisions free from persecution, to have the opportunity to make free choices about religion and other things in life as long as one's decisions do not create harm for others. In essence, the norm describes a free democratic environment portrayed by free elections, and the willingness to cooperate with other nations to ensure wealthy survival.

For a gap member to move towards becoming a member of the core group, they must be secure within. Barnett states that diplomacy will not work in a region where the biggest sources of insecurity lie not between states but within them. This insecurity leads to a lack of personal freedom which translates into dead-end lives for most of the population. (Barnett, 5)

One can see how the security of the United States is more than dealing with the have and have-nots. The core and gap arguments become more understandable as one sees that the security depends upon the nation's ability to continue to export security to the core, while it also begins the systematic, long-term export of security to the gap. Until a gap member moves away from the authoritarian, dictatorship style government and toward a government more for the

people and by the people, the United States will continue to have issues ranging from terrorism through other instabilities. (Barnett, 5)

One must understand that there is more to decreasing the disconnectedness between core and gap than simply providing security. To decrease the disparity between the two after establishing a secure environment, one must work to assist the gap member to develop a strong economical base. It must grow to be able to sustain itself and care properly for all members of its society. Security is merely the first step in this process. These are more likely to be the type of threats the United States will encounter in the future. One should however be cautious about saying the nation will never face another large nation to nation type war. The nation must be prepared for such an incident while also being prepared for the development of the members of the gap to move toward the core environment. As the nation prepares for this militarily, new technology will undoubtedly be introduced continually.

The military leaders must drive this technological development to support the concepts contributed by the tried and true principles of war. The idea of developing principles that would exploit the use of new technology must be approached with caution. The military knows that the principles of war work in situations when each of the nine are given due consideration and as many as possible are being exploited simultaneously to defeat the enemy. The principles used by learned, professional leaders will lead to victory many more times than not. As the nation moves into the future and concerns itself with what the future of war will be like, leaders must use extreme caution when considering changes to the guiding principles of war because of developing technologies. The leaders must again drive the technology to exploit what one

understands will ensure success. What better example of this does the military have than the nine principles of war?

Many of the arguments one can readily read that support the need to change the principles will discuss the changing technology or the changing in the type of enemy the nation will face in the future. As discussed here, the nation will have to contend with the insecurity of the gap member, but one must not forget that there remain several unstable country leaders with stated nuclear powers. Barnett states,

America stands at a point to redefine not just our way of war but that of the entire planet. Those commentators who warn about a second nuclear age simply do not get it. They argue that America has become so powerful in a conventional (or nonnuclear) sense that the only way any state will be able to counter our power in the future is to acquire and be willing to use nuclear weapons. This was allegedly the great lesson of Desert Storm (don't fight the Americans unless you have nukes!), and many alarmists repeat that claim after Operation Iraqi Freedom. But the world is moving in another direction. We tend to see the world moving away from nuclear weapons. There are a couple of states (Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and a few other possibilities) that clearly exist outside the security rule set to such a degree that contemplating such war with them is not idle speculation. (Barnett, 330)

As theorists, historians, and military leaders consider the principles and their use, the fact that the United States may need to fight both large and small foes must be considered. In doing so, one can readily see how each of the nine principles define concepts that remain usable today as they were in the recent past.

Often analysts believe it is time to change the principles because there is a feeling of change within the political system of the United States. The perception is that with each newly elected

President there are changes to the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. In reality, these strategies have been fundamentally unchanging for over sixty years.

The overarching document that governs what the military will do and what types of conflicts they find themselves in contention with is the National Security Strategy. When one considers that this strategy has endured since the end of World War II it becomes less of a concern that the principles of war have not changed. These types of things are slow to change, as they should be. Essentially, the strategy has been to protect the American democratic way of life. The strategy provides guidance for leaders who deal with the country's foreign policy and when an effective strategy is written, it acts as the organizing principle that helps statesmen identify and prioritize the country's geopolitical interests (Sempa, 1). The practice of attaching the President's name to foreign policy lends itself to one's belief that the United States is a nation in constant change. Political incumbents feel a necessity to sell to their respective constituency the idea that something has been accomplished during their time in office. These accomplishments are often associated with changes. Because of the United States' outstanding ability to survive as a democratic nation, one associated with free elections linked to a prescribed cycle, it is one that is described as being focused on change, not continuity, and on the initiatives and new policy pronouncements of both presidents and presidential aspirants (Kegley, 10).

Analysts of American foreign policy suggest that this perception of constant changes is a mistaken exaggeration of attention to high-sounding political rhetoric and transient departures. When one looks at America's foreign policy using a long term perspective, what initially looks like a turning point more often than not becomes another point at which American foreign policy

has failed to turn. What has occurred is that existing policies remain while the politician articulates or echoes previous policy rhetoric and actions in its own words and deeds. Any measured deviation from any previous policy is rare and usually, temporary in nature. Analysts agree that a combination of external factors and the American foreign policy process militates against sharp departures from the past and instead encourages national leaders to maintain a steady course (Kegley, 10).

This success soundly establishes the reasons that the United States will go to war. The basic premise is that the nation will do what is necessary to protect its existence and wealth for today and for the generations of tomorrow. This is the same strategy that the nation has maintained for over sixty years. In order to maintain these security efforts, the focus will need to be on the entities that make up the gap while also maintaining a strong awareness of the few rogue leaders who have access and capabilities of deploying weapons of mass destruction. America will go to war when necessary based upon careful consideration and the lack of other options. The public will desire to have the decision to do so thoroughly discussed and approved by Congress, just as the law prescribes. The people will also desire to see strong alliances built, and to have the input of the United Nations as well. Present and future administrations must understand arguably the most important principle of war – the principle of the objective. Administrations will be prudent to develop speeches that describe the objectives being sought by committing resources to a war. During war, the people will desire to minimize casualties, both friendly and enemy. They will also desire to minimize damage to national economies to facilitate the integration of these civilizations into the global economy. The administration in charge must understand that the

people will better support the objective they set for war if the death and destruction is proportional to that of the enemy. (Barnett, 335-336)

As one continues an evaluation of the principles of war it is important to understand these issues. Having a firm foundation of the nation's strategy is useful when considering the utility of the concepts the principles represent. One can deduce that war is inevitable because of the political nature of the civilizations that man has established. The disconnectedness of these civilizations will inevitably endure conflicts in the future as efforts continue to minimize the economical differences. The nation must continue to have a military prepared for war, and the military must continue to have a set of guiding concepts to assist the leaders in their quest for success. Applying these tried and proven principles in a skillful manner greatly assists the prudent leader to achieve victory.

The President included in the National Security Strategy the desire to build either coalitions or alliances with other nations before committing the nation's resources to war. It is important to understand that the United States does not have unlimited resources to police the world or to assist members of the gap to align more with members of the core. Not only will the nation have to integrate all of its power to include economic, diplomatic, military, and information powers, it will have to seek assistance from other nations. This desire to conduct combined, joint warfare is not new, but must be considered as one debates potential changes, additions, or deletions to the current principles of war that the military teaches.

As one must understand the nation's desire to build coalitions, it is also necessary to understand that the United States will act unilaterally when necessary. The idea of unilateral action may sound new and as a result it may drive some theorist and military leaders to think that there is an urgent need to rewrite the principles of war to reflect this strategy. But in reality, the current idea of "preemption" as espoused by President Bush is far from being new or a revolutionary thought process for the nation.

Preemption sounds new only because it's old: it's a nineteenth century concept, rooted in concerns about security along the nation's expanding borders. The 'terrorist' of that day caused Americans on the frontier to fear for their lives. Today's terrorists provoke similar anxieties, but the frontiers now can be anywhere, which means that targets can be everywhere. (Gaddis, 86)

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld appears to be in complete agreement with this facet of the National Security Strategy. He has learned from experiences in the Middle East that it is difficult if not impossible to defend against terrorism. To provide an adequate defense, one must go on the offensive (a valid principle of war) and take the fight to the enemy. Secretary Rumsfeld has stated, "You can't defend at every place at every time against every technique. You just can't do it, because they just keep changing techniques, time, and you have to go after them. And you have to take it to them, and that means you have to preempt them." (Woodward, 34)

The National Military Strategy developed to support this idea reflects a 1-4-2-1 concept of force deployment. The United States will engage and win the global war on terrorism, the nation will forward base resources in four different geographical areas, it will use these resources to maintain the ability to engage in two simultaneous conflicts with the ability to decisively win in one before moving to the other.

To support this policy, the Secretary reviewed many of the existing war plans maintained by the different geographical commanders, and did not agree with many of the assumptions nor with the timelines to build up forces in theater that many of the plans contained. They did not adequately support the President's new defense strategy. The Secretary believes the United States needs to maintain the capability to deter aggression against the national interests by demonstrating a capacity to swiftly defeat attacks. The Secretary stated, "Look, we've got to do two things. We owe the country and the President war plans, contingency plans, thinking that is current. And the only way we're going to get that is if we can compress that process dramatically and shorten it from years down to some cycle that it can be refreshed with current assumptions." (Woodward, 34)

This policy certainly reflects on principles such as mass, maneuver, offense, economy of force, and objective. One can see the need to understand the nation's strategies and the desires of the leaders while considering any revisions to the principles of war. As these changes are occurring and words like transformation are continually used, many believe that these adjustments must bring about changes to the current principles of war. However, one can see that the principles continue to be valid during recent conflicts just as they have been valid for conflicts of the past. The military has seen these principles work; they know they can succeed when applied with a valid strategy in a knowledgeable, artful, and skillful manner. One must consider change, but be aware of changes just for the sake of changes. As was done during the embryonic stages of the principles, debates on potential changes must ensue. One will find that technology is developing and is changing many tactical procedures, but the current principles

continue to endure requiring only a new way of thinking to properly apply their concepts. This again speaks highly of the farsightedness of the original developers.

War is a business for those who think for there will never be a tool that one can methodically employ to ensure success. War must stay on our minds, its weight presses one into thinking and imagining. The research appears to substantiate that Machiavelli was right: “A prince . . . should have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other things for his study, but war; [he] ought . . . never to let his thought stray from the exercise of war; and in peace he ought to practice it more than in war.” (Hillman, 36)

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Objective

Again, the principle of objective is arguably the most important principle one must consider. Research shows this may be because setting the correct objective possibly drives all subsequent actions. All planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, by military and civilians, may have the ultimate goal as either supporting the achievement of the objectives, or meeting the objectives themselves. Clausewitz states, “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” (Clausewitz, 579)

Clausewitz describes three elements that must interact during conflict. These elements are the government, the people, and the military. Once the government has decided that it is within the national interest to commit the military into harms way, or to employ any element of national power today, the administration should labor to gain the support of the majority of the people. The fastest way to do this is to set objectives that the public will most likely support. If they are not supportable, then the military should not be committed unless there is grave danger the people are not able to comprehend. The administration must be forthright concerning the educated estimates on the time it will potentially require, and the resources, both human and material, that are needed to obtain the desired end state when explaining the objectives to the public. Honesty is required in the beginning otherwise the support will disappear in a prolonged effort and obtaining the objectives will become difficult, if not impossible.

The Vietnam War (though not formally declared) is the most used example of how a flawed or misunderstood objective can lead to failure. The comments from General Abrams clearly show that the national objectives had not been clearly articulated to the military, which certainly supports the idea that the American people did not clearly understand them either.

Before Abrams arrived, U.S. objectives in Vietnam had been at best uncertain. Army generals who commanded there, polled by Douglas Kinnard, responded overwhelmingly that before 1969 those objectives were neither clear nor understandable. Commented Kinnard, “That almost 70 percent of the Army generals who managed the war were uncertain of its objectives mirrors a deep-seated strategic failure.” As the new commander, Abrams later said, “I wanted to look seriously at what my job was, what my mission was what they wanted me to do, what they expected me to get done. So I immediately put some people to work gathering me official documents so I could study it and get myself oriented on the chain of command and so on. That is a very frustrating story. And it was so unreal, what was going on, compared to that – that I then organized a study group to determine what my mission should be.” (Sorley, 123)

And in 1970 when General Abrams’ new deputy reported for duty in Vietnam he asked what was the mission. General Abrams responded “Who the hell knows? You know what has to be done. I know what has to be done. Let’s get on with it.” (Sorley, 216) Obviously there existed a disconnect in the triangle described by Clausewitz. The government did not communicate the objectives well to either the military or the people.

This above example shows that General Abrams created his own objectives. This alone is not a violation of the principle for there will be military objectives and national strategic objectives. However, as stated earlier, the National Security Strategy is the overarching document and it drives the efforts of the military. As such, national strategic objectives will drive the military objectives. The two may be different, but the military must be supportive of the national

objectives. Liddell Hart writes, “The military objective is only the means to a political end. Hence the military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily – that is, practically – impossible.” (Hart, 351) The problem for the General was that the strategic objective was neither clear to him nor to the people.

It is true that non-rational political objectives can be implemented by rational means. The fact that politics provide the purpose for waging war does not mean that the purpose itself is always rational. (Handel, 79) However, once the irrationality of the objectives are uncovered, and they will be, the actions of the public is unlikely to be pleasant. For Vietnam, it should be no surprise to anyone that the public’s support quickly disappeared and that their demonstrations against the war were so vocal. Objectives are important and they need public support. They need to be clearly understood by all.

The idea that the objective unites the elements of the triangle makes it one of the most important principles. The principle of objective is used to tie together all other aspects of war.

Some will argue that public support has become so important in how our nation operates that it should become a stand-alone principle. It is an unstated prerequisite to gain public support and it is equally important to sustain public support during the employment of any of the nation’s elements of power. The most prudent method of obtaining public support is to have an objective, or set of objectives, that the public agrees upon or can support. For if the majority of the people of the United States are unable to understand why an administration has put America’s sons and

daughters in harms way, or why an administration is willing to expend the nation's resources to ensure stated outcomes, then the objectives might be unwarranted. Therefore, attaining and sustaining public support is a viable facet of applying the principle of objective.

One of the quickest means in today's society to obtain the public support for National strategic objectives is through the media. Using articles in newspapers, magazines, and the Internet will surely assist in getting information to the people. Objectives need to be explained, argued, and debated. The President needs to get the majority of the people to support the objectives before committing the nation's resources to any type of situation where armed conflict maybe involved.

Another means, and one that is often the quickest media form, is through television. News reporters are embedded with operational units now in ways that have never been seen before. This is a prime example of how technology has impacted the manner war is waged. This is not to say that media needs to become a principle of war, but it is important to understand how media can impact the support of the objectives. Strong objectives that convince the people that the nation needs to be conducting the efforts using the military and other elements of national power in order to promote the security of the nation are a must. The weak objectives will begin to lose support once the violence of combat, the death and destruction that will inevitably occur, is viewed or discussed through the media. Objectives must be strong, they must be supported before committing the nation's resources, and the President must continue to use all aspects of the media to maintain and strengthen that support during the conflict.

Consider the efforts of General Clark during air campaign in Kosovo in the early 1990's. The General understood the need to gain support for the objectives because this support ensured necessary assistance and resources would be available when needed. The need for United States backing of the objectives was clearly demonstrated during the beginning of the air attacks. The General was aware that in order to maintain this support, the American public had to believe that other nations were supporting the efforts in Kosovo. The Pentagon maintained pressure on the General to ensure that as many allied aircraft as possible were involved in the operation in order to deflect criticisms about burden sharing. The General later discusses his actions the night the air attacks began.

Tom Brokaw appeared in a special report that we received by satellite, reporting that the 'American-led air strikes' had begun. For us, Brokaw's choice of words indicated that we had gotten off on the wrong foot with the public. Allied participation had been a sensitive issue throughout the planning phase of the operation, with the Pentagon pressing to ensure that as many Allied aircraft as possible were involved in the operation.... I directed our public affairs staff officer to call NBC about correcting the report – these were NATO air strikes, not American – led air strikes. NBC promptly changed the way it was characterizing the strikes. (Clark, 195)

Kosovo was a NATO sponsored operation involving several nations and General Clark as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe was responsible for the success or failure of the operation. He understood that the same type of public support for the objectives was needed in other countries as well as the United States. Ideologies may be different, but nevertheless, freely elected political leaders need public support to continue the pursuit of stated objectives. Often the pursuit of objectives become very sensitive and one incident that could be misconstrued by the general population could hinder objective accomplishment.

During the first night of the air attacks a Dutch aircraft was credited with shooting down at least one enemy aircraft. General Clark saw this as a good event for the United States and the Dutch. It would show the United States that other nations were also assuming risk and it would be an event that the Dutch could be proud of. The response from the Dutch Chief of Defense was not immediately as exciting. He told General Clark:

“Please don’t announce that it was one of our aircraft that was involved,” he said. He would want time to make all the appropriate notifications within the Netherlands before this came out publicly. It was an indication of the sensitivity of the operation in many nations.

As stated earlier, the President has directed in the National Security Strategy that the nation will pursue its objectives with coalition partners when possible. The principle appears to remain as valid today, if not more so, as it was when first codified in 1921. Other nations may not prescribe to the same principles as are stated in the doctrinal manuals of the United States, which is an issue that needs to be addressed, but nevertheless, the people of their nations will have to be appeased also. The issues General Clark endured during the Kosovo operation best describe this concern. When exercising the principle of objective, planners must consider the need for public support not only for their own country, but also for the countries that may be involved in as an ally or part of the coalition. The planners and the commanders will have additional confidence in the willingness of the coalition partners to assist in accomplishing the objectives if they are sure about the existing popular support of their coalition partners’ national objectives.

Just as Admiral Brown described the supporters and non-supporters of the principles of war in 1949, there are critics today. One critic has offered opinions about the existing principles stating why they are no longer current. For objective, Leonhard simplifies the objective at the tactical

level to be only to kill the enemy. Survival is undoubtedly one's ultimate objective at the tactical level. Here, the men look face to face with one another then attempt to kill before being killed. However, to ensure the will to fight continues, the reason for fighting must be clearly understood. Sure, the will to live will drive one to fight, but to encourage the implementers of tactics to continue the fight must come back to the objective for the fight in the first place. The service men of our nation understand politics more today than the warriors of the past. It is an all-volunteer service with many if not all volunteering because they want to gain upward mobility in society by serving their country and supporting the nation's objectives. And today the servicemen do not hesitate to ask why. In fact, when issuing orders, leaders are more apt to give directions and tell why the need exists to carry out the orders being issued. It is important for the warriors to understand the objectives, if for no other reason than to carry on with the mission in the absence of their tactical leaders.

Leonhard continues the discussion of the objective by using the Weinberger doctrine. He accuses the developers of this doctrine to be seeking operational autonomy. His arguments are through the Weinberger doctrine, the military leaders did not want to see the mission change once the nation committed its forces to combat. Leonhard states, "This idea [to have a clear objective before committing the military] has become a deified foundation to American military strategic thinking." (Leonhard, 146) This is not difficult to understand when one considers the dismal failure of the administration to have clear objectives for the military during the Vietnam War. That war, and the experiences of those who fought in it, was the catalyst for Weinberger doctrine. The military leaders do not desire to see lives loss for unachievable or unclear objectives. The nation must know and understand the requirements necessary to achieve its

objectives before committing American forces in most cases. So, to say that military leaders have placed the need for objectives next to godliness is not such a bad idea. It shows that they understand the principle of objective and its importance.

Leonhard argues that the military leaders have other desires in mind when fighting for objectives. He states that the leaders desire to operate autonomously without any influence or interference from political leaders. “The point we must understand is that the principle of objective, as applied to the strategic level of war, carries with it a subtle, tacit demand by military leaders for autonomy in action.” This is an extremely misleading statement. The military leaders may indeed desire to operate autonomously, but they are much smarter than Leonhard apparently gives them credit to be.

The leaders understand the role of the political leaders as well as the role of other political organizations both government and non-governmental groups. General Franks briefed political leaders, to include the President of the United States, at least six different times on his plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom. (Fitzgerald) Leaders and planners today openly discuss the need to integrate the many different political organizations involved in ensuring the success of the nation to meet its goals, or more aptly stated, its objectives. Are there military leaders who desire to operate autonomously? Sure, but they know the strength gained in operating in a joint, combined effort. Leonhard’s argument, along with other similar arguments, to support the removal of this principle is flawed. The principle of objective is important for the conflicts of tomorrow. It is the principle that should drive the efforts of not only the military, but also all the elements of national power. All organizations must set objectives that either obtain, or support

obtaining, the national objective. The principle remains valid as the military continues its transformation and regardless of what it is called, network centric warfare, asymmetrical warfare, effects based operations, operational net assessment, the principle of objective must be maintained. Without an objective, the nation may falter aimlessly and valuable resources, most importantly the nation's sons and daughters, may be squandered for naught. The principle of objective may be needed when dealing with the members of the gap or with the core.

Mass

The principle of mass has become one that of the most discussed of the nine. It is important to understand as one reads and ponders these discussions that it is not the concept of mass that is changing. It appears that the entity being massed may have changed. An analysis of how General Franks and his military planners applied the concept of mass will help to show how this principle may remain important.

To show the changes in the meaning to the principle of mass one can review how General Franks and his staff moved outside the box of traditional war planning. The General and his staff, acting on the guidance delivered by Secretary Rumsfeld, began to move away from the classic military plan of an air campaign of massive bombings followed by ground operations. This was the manner that the first war with Iraq was conducted in which the nation, following the principle of mass, conducted an extensive air campaign before committing the ground troops. General Franks and his staff understood the much better approach to mass would be obtained by utilizing all available assets in unison. He first considered this method when conducting the war

in Afghanistan when he used lines of operations. These lines of operations are described as actions that can be carried out independently and often simultaneously. (Woodward, 54)

The General developed this plan partly because he lacked staging areas for the war in Afghanistan. As a result, the General relied heavily on smaller, special operations forces. The General leveraged these forces by their use of laser designators to guide bombs from Air Force or Navy aircraft onto precise targets. This integration of air and ground assets in such an extensive manner exceeded past military operations. (Woodward, 54) This type of integration is what is needed to continue to exercise the principle of mass.

No longer does the principle of mass pertain to symmetrical type warfare. No longer are mathematical equations needed to produce two to one ratios in personnel or bombs. War fighters of the future, military along with governmental and non-governmental agencies, must continue to exercise the principle of mass by realizing the need to mass capabilities to produce effects. This is exactly what General Franks did as he planned the war in Iraq - a plan that needed to draw on all elements of national power. (Woodward, 54)

The General knew his lines of operations would be a key to a successful campaign. He knew that he would not only have to mass the capabilities of his air and ground forces by using them simultaneously and independently as needed. He also saw the need to mass the capabilities of other elements of national power to produce overwhelming effects.

General Franks understood the potential effects of grouping large numbers of troops especially if Saddam Hussein decided to use weapons of mass destruction. (Franks, 376, 389) Such large numbers of troops could easily be targeted by these systems to produce unacceptable casualties. He knew that each line of operation could be used separately, but combining the capabilities of each prescribed line, he would create a critical mass that would reduce the amount of conventional combat power that would be needed. (Woodward, 54) The plan that General Franks presented to the President for the war in Iraq had seven lines of operations:

1. Kinetic operations or “operational fires” that would include the traditional air campaign of bombing, but also the use of Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from ships or aircraft, plus long-range ground-to-ground systems.
2. Unconventional warfare utilizing Special Operations Forces who could conduct deep penetrations into Iraq – for example, lethal raids to stop the firing of Scud missiles into Israel or Saudi Arabia.
3. Operational maneuvers, the traditional ground operations of conventional forces to be carried out by Army and Marine divisions.
4. Influence operations – the dissemination of information, and a wide range of psychological and deception operations.
5. Support of the opposition groups throughout Iraq, including the Kurds in the north and disaffected Shiite groups in southern Iraq or even within the Iraqi military. This would be in full coordination with the CIA.
6. The political–military aspects of diplomacy, including civil-military operations to work with the populace mostly after the major fighting.
7. Humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi population. (Woodward, 55)

The General and his staff, whether purposefully or not, exercised a prudent use of the principle of mass during the planning phase. They knew, as Woodward has stated, that the combination of the effects generated by each of these efforts would produce a winning blow. It is interesting to note that each line could be conducted as a single operation, but it was the combined effect that the General sought. One may argue the outcome of the war did not see each of these items fully exploited, but the emphasis here is that they were considered and included in war plans. Once again, research did not reveal any conversations where the principles of war, in this case the

principle of mass were considered in some type of check list, but the study of the operation shows how the General made plans to apply mass. As stated earlier, the study and teaching of the principles are important and must continue for military leaders and planners to use these principles as a guide to generate success.

Critics of this argue that the transformation within the military calls for a change to the principle of mass. New technologies and capabilities have changed the way war is conducted and therefore negates many of the principles. As stated earlier, Napoleon's front was not the length that either General Schwarzkopf or General Franks dealt with during their wars with Iraq. Technology has indeed changed the size of the fronts and critics argue that it is not safe or prudent to attempt to mass forces such as Napoleon would have done. The killing capability of modern weapons precludes this form of warfare and to do so would call for mass murder. The "highway of death" that General Schwarzkopf describes gives an enlightened example of what happens in today's conflicts when men and material are caught in a relatively confined space. However, the argument that the critics use against this principle, that mass defines the grouping of men to create combat power, is not fully correct. The critics need to read and understand the definition to see that mass is still very much applicable to today's conflicts. The reader must understand that the concept of the principle deals with the massing of effects derived from combat power. This argument used by critics is no different than one used years ago.

Admiral Brown, in his efforts to show the importance of the principle of mass, stated, "mass means superior numbers, but not numbers of fighting units alone. It means material, fire power, weapons, skill, resolution, discipline, leadership, administration, and morale." This statement demonstrated that in 1949 the effect generated by material, fire power, skill, morale, etc., was

indeed the result of the application of the principle of mass. And over 50 years later, the reader must continue to understand that the principle of mass deals with effects – not mere numbers of men. It is the quickly obtained and sustained effects such as General Franks desired to generate that are the primary concepts behind the principle of mass today. There is no need to change the principle, but to understand that as technology changes, so does the manner that one generates mass. The principle, the concept of mass and how it leads to success, remains valid. The nation will continue to mass effects against conventional forces while it also learns additional methods to apply the principle to non conventional threats such as terrorist organizations.

Yet other critics of the principle of mass consider concepts such as simultaneity and precision to more appropriately describe the principle that is needed for the transforming military. Some believe that the nation's heavy reliance on precision munitions raises doubts about the common application of the principle of mass. This is interesting at first glance but again it shows a misunderstanding of the current joint definition of mass and its references to effects.

Admiral John Morgan and Dr. Anthony McIvor make persuasive arguments to change the principle of mass to reflect changes in technology but their persuasions are not completely effective. The Admiral's arguments for this change compare the number of bombs needed to destroy a target during World War II with the number of bombs needed today. And, with the increase in technology dealing with precision guided munitions, one can readily see that the required number of bombs to engage targets today is considerably less. The Admiral states, "looking again at our ability to destroy a target with one shot and considering the likelihood that the target will be in an urban setting, we may consider the principle as more accurately a

concentration of effect rather than of mass.” (Morgan, 36) This is precisely the argument that is made to support the fact that the principle of mass is germane and important for today. The misunderstanding is the word mass and one’s insistence that the principle refers to only massing people. Morgan also noted that Napoleon used a mass of firepower and personnel to achieve a desired effect because the limitations of his technology required it. (Morgan, 36) It is important to note here that Napoleon understood the need to generate effects, to mass effects. What has changed is the manner the effects are massed. The nation can now mass effects by using precision munitions to engage appropriate targets, or by using other elements of national power to negatively effect the capabilities of an adversary. Admiral Morgan misses the mark when suggesting that the principle should be changed to persistent precision as a contemporary alternative.

The needed change is to understand what needs to be massed. It is no longer necessary to mass people because technology has allowed alternatives. It is important to understand the concept behind the principle, that one needs to mass capabilities to produce effects that negatively impact an adversary. The problem with Admiral Morgan’s suggestion is that it is too myopic. Persistent precision deals with attacking specific targets and does not lend itself to consider the effect of attacking the targets. Precision is important especially when considering the nation’s desire to minimize collateral damage, but what is more important is to understand why the targets are attacked – to generate effects that when taken as a whole (massed) will have an adverse effect on the adversary.

Leonhard dismisses the idea of massing effects because it is too vague for application. He does state that the original phrasing of the principle of mass envisioned the physical concentration of soldiers as the most effective means of defeating the enemy. (Leonhard, 118)

The same technology that prohibits the massing of troops can be used to mass the effects that he dismisses. Because of technology, military leaders and planners must distribute their forces throughout their operational theater. In doing so, the planners and leaders must link assigned missions and objectives. It serves little benefit if a unit is given an objective that does not support the obtaining of the national or strategic desired end state. Every unit distributed throughout the commander's area of responsibility must be given an objective that supports the same desired results. The success in achieving the assigned objectives, simultaneously or sequentially, produces the desired effects. The combination of these effects, or massing the effects, generates strategic and national success.

The principle of mass has been applied in modern conflicts and has a place in the transformation of the military. As transformation occurs, it is important that the concepts behind the principles are understood and the means adjusted to reflect the technological advancements. One must remember that the principles are tried and true and that technology must be used to continually exploit the concepts behind the principles. Precision engagement is extremely important as the nation transforms, but it is the multiple precise engagements (mass) that generate the effects on the enemy that ultimately reduces his will to fight or resist.

Unity of Command

The principle of unity of command is certainly one that becomes important during times of conflict. The United States instituted several changes to the military's manner of conducting business with the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols act in 1986. There were many reasons for the changes directed in the act, one being the barracks bombing in Beirut where hundreds of Marines lost their lives. The ensuing investigation revealed there was too much ambiguity in the chain of command. One found it difficult to determine what commander was setting the objectives or who was responsible of the security of the units involved. The act now empowers the geographical commander as the commander responsible for all military actions in the assigned geographical part of the world. The act also ensures the geographical commander has the power and authority to direct actions as deemed necessary to ensure among other things, the security of the forces. This action demonstrates the continued need for the principle of unity of command. When the nation commits its forces and other natural resources, there is little time to determine who is in charge and who is setting the objectives at any level. Ambiguity in such matters will surely lead to unwarranted death and destruction. As the definition states, unity of effort is necessary and desired in all situations, but this is a subset of the principle of unity of command. The principle remains effective for today's forces and should be effective for the forces during the transformation process. It appears effective for all levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.

One can see the principle of unity of command exercised during the war in Iraq. As prescribed by the Goldwater-Nichols act, General Franks had the responsibility to plan and execute the war. He did not need to confer with the service chiefs or to gain approval from

service chiefs concerning the concept of operations that he prepared. It is obvious that he understood this, nevertheless, the President and the Secretary of Defense also understood that having each of the service chiefs understand the plan works to ensure unity of command and unity of effort. The President, by getting support from the commanders at the highest levels was employing the principle of unity of command and thereby ensuring the full support of the operation.

During the planning for the war in Iraq, the service chiefs were deliberately kept from participating in the planning until the secretary of defense arranged a meeting for them with the President. During this meeting, without the geographical commander, General Franks, the President asked for their opinion. Each service chief expressed valid concerns but all responded the plan as presented could be supported. These concerns did not fall on deaf ears for the President's senior staff later directed actions to be taken to eliminate many of the voiced concerns. (Woodward, 207) The President maintained unity of command at the highest level and ensured support for the operation through this meeting. He wanted the service chiefs to speak freely, but it was clear that he was in charge and that General Franks was the person responsible for the execution of the plan. The President artfully applied the principle of unity of command to achieve unity of effort. These modern examples show that the principle remains valid.

There are critics of this principle who believe it has outlived its usefulness, assuming it was ever useful. Leonhard sites battles where a side was successful without unity of command and also sites battles where the commander, exercising the principle unity of command, made late or

poor decisions that resulted in the loss of additional life. He obviously does not think the principle should remain and states,

The principle of unity of command is too decrepit to be fit for modern war. In reality, unity of command has always been nothing more than a technique for getting at what we really want: effective integration of battlefield activities. In its prime, this principle simply stated that unifying combatants under one commander was a proven and effective way of accomplishing this integration. A highly effective method, but not an end state. (Leonhard, 195)

Leonhard argues that the information age will eliminate any ideas that a need exists for unity of command. He also argues that future wars will undoubtedly be fought using joint, combined efforts which use resources from both military and private governmental organizations. And it is illegal for the military to be in command of such organizations.

These are valid arguments but they are arguments to show that during transformation there exists a need for a different manner of thinking. There are discussions ongoing concerning command relationships where the thought is that the military will change from notions of operational control, tactical control, or administrative control to more of a supported and supporting role. This notion eliminates the legalities of placing the military in control of certain organizations which current laws prohibit, and establishes a single reference point, the supported entity, to be the one that is driving the efforts. So with this new way of thinking about unity of command, one will generate unity of effort. Without such relationships, there would be anarchy on the battlefield. Units will be doing what they think is correct with no cohesive efforts toward a common end state. Fog and friction will ensure anarchy conditions will exist on the battlefield, but the principle of unity of command will ensure one source overall is responsible for the efforts of all. This source is responsible for ensuring all subordinates, and all supporting organizations,

understand his intent and the objective. In doing so, the units in the anarchy conditions will know what actions need to be taken that best support the objective of the supported commander.

The principle of unity of command remains valid today and there are modern day examples that work to support its validity. There are critics that believe the information age will eliminate the need for such a principle, but in reality, the information age will better support the principle. Having unity of command ensures a common objective that works to synchronize the efforts of all. It is important to ensure anarchy conditions are minimized while attempting to gain unity of effort. The technology of the information age will assist in ensuring all understand the objective of the one ultimately responsible for success thus achieving unity of command.

Maneuver

The concept of this principle has survived several different labels attached to it. One example is movement. According to Webster's New World dictionary, movement can mean action toward a goal and maneuver is the planned movement of troops, warships, etc. Both terms are associated with an action conducted to meet certain goals, but the important issue is that maneuver is not simply the movement of troops. This provides a better understanding why this principle remains germane as the military continues to transform. There are, however, several examples that readily show the principle in use and as a viable concept that assists in generating success.

The first example is known as the great left hook that General Schwarzkopf used for maneuver in the war to free Kuwait from Iraq in 1991. This maneuver proved to be extremely

successful for the nation. Another is operation Anaconda that called for a hammer and anvil effect using United States and Afghanistan assets. Although this operation was successful, there were some issues with the plan that have generated much debate. Nevertheless, it is a good example that this principle appears to remain valid. Also in Afghanistan the Special Forces units were used to maneuver in the area of operation to act as sensors. They located targets and used air assets to destroy them. This is also a good example of the movement of troops to place the enemy at a disadvantage.

Another example is how General Franks maneuvered his forces to recently defeat Saddam Hussein. The speed of this maneuver of ground forces quickly outdistanced organic communication assets and sustainment elements. This called for pauses in the movement; nevertheless, the speed General Franks used kept the enemy forces at a disadvantage. All are modern examples of validation as to why the principle of maneuver remains valid.

Just as Admiral Brown stated in his 1949 article, the principle of maneuver is much more than rapidly getting warships, troops, etc. to a position to place the enemy at a disadvantage. The forces must be maintained once maneuvered therefore sustainment becomes a very important subset of maneuver. This also applies to modern day aircraft that can maneuver from the United States to almost any place in the world to deliver ordnance. However, in doing so, air bridges need to be established to ensure fuel tankers are airborne in specific locations along the route to resupply the attack aircraft.

At least one military officer has made good arguments for sustainment as a tenth principle arguing that without it, maneuver of any type would not be possible. The thesis of his argument is that sustainment does not receive the highest priority of the commander's focus and that by making it a principle, it may receive the attention during war plans that it rightfully deserves. However, he also mentions the counter argument that sustainment is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Sustainment does not have any mental images regarding what is happening on the battlefield. (Rast, 1) These arguments are well presented, but once again this is a subset of the principle maneuver. It exists to support the efforts of the elements being moved and is an inherent responsibility of command. It is also necessary to remember that the principles are not hardened tasks that must be accomplished to be successful. A commander may not follow or meet the conditions of one of the principles but that does not necessarily equal failure. However, the inability to sustain a force could undoubtedly equal failure because attempting to fight a conflict without sufficient food, water, ammunition, spare parts, etc., may make success unattainable.

Sustainment probably belongs as a subset, an enabler, for many of the principles, but it may not be necessary to adapt it as a principle of war. Planners must be aware of the need to address all elements of sustainment – personnel, equipment, material, and organizations (staffs necessary to command, plan, execute, and control) in order to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. This is to say that in order to meet the purpose of maneuver, one must include sustainment. Therefore, it may not be necessary to include sustainment as a principle of war merely to ensure it receives the necessary attention from commanders.

Another author suggests that this principle is outdated, fundamentally flawed, because it suggests that ground maneuver is the primary way to achieve an advantage over the enemy. He adeptly argues that modern forces can achieve the advantage through many different means, such as technology, organization, moral and political preparation, and tempo. (Leonhard, 79) Further analysis of the definition found in the joint publication may bring one to question this argument.

This writing appears to show the need to change the thinking process one has toward the principles of war. Readers need to see the Joint Publication definition and understand that it is the movement of forces (usually ground forces) to put the enemy at a disadvantage. This does not state specifically ground forces and to think so may be erroneous. To use that thought process as a reason for deleting or changing the principle appears to be erroneous. To understand how the principle of maneuver applies now and in the future, it is necessary to see that the force the definition mentions could represent any element of national power.

As the nation continues to transform, the need to employ all elements of national power is expected to increase in importance. Each of these elements will be maneuvered to achieve support from other countries or to assist the nation to position itself to gain an advantage over the enemy. An example is the diplomatic maneuvering that had to be conducted to convince Turkey to allow over flight rights to U.S. aircraft during the recent war against Iraq. The principles can and should be used at all levels of war.

Forces will continue to maneuver in the future and these forces should include all elements of national power – not solely ground troops. Maneuver will be important as the nation faces

conflicts with members of the gap and the core. The United States must be ready to conduct movement using any of the elements to gain an advantage – to place the nation in the position to be successful. This could mean using the media to set the stage to gain public support for the objective, or using computer assets to move economic interests to gain the advantage on the opposing member. As such, the principle of maneuver should remain and all need to gain a deeper understanding of what forces the nation can maneuver more effectively to create success.

Offensive

Fuller most aptly describes this principle – “The aim of the principle of the offensive is to compel the enemy to accept our will with the least expenditure of force. The offensive is, consequently, not merely a brutal act, but largely an intelligent act.” (Fuller, 283) This description shows how this principle applies to all levels of war. It is not simply an act of maneuvering forces in an aggressive manner to defeat an enemy, although this is certainly one application of the principle, but it includes actions that can be taken at the strategic and operational level. As stated, the overarching document that guides the nation’s security initiatives is the National Security Strategy document that the President signs. There exists no better document or source to show that this principle is valid for today and for days to come.

In the National Security Strategy, the President states,

The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are

fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action. (Bush, 2)

There are other modern examples of military forces implementing the principle of the offensive, but this example from the President, sets the stage for all. It shows that the principle is valid, should be used, and when used effectively in combination with other principles of war, will probably increase the likelihood of success.

There are critics who argue the principle is outdated and confusing. One critic argues that when a force goes on the offensive there is no guarantee it will gain the initiative and it could very well lose the initiative. (Leonhard, 84) These are certainly good arguments, but they have been used with a misunderstanding of the principle.

Fuller's work in the early 1900's ensured that the principles chosen were based on historical evidence that when applied together they usually led to success. One can certainly find examples of forces going on the offensive and not gaining the initiative, but before disregarding offensive as a viable principle it is necessary to understand what caused the failure. This examination will need to analyze the efforts of each force to apply other principles of war. As stated, gaining the offensive often involves maneuver and sustainment as its subset. If a force commits to the offensive and outmaneuvers the sustainment ability then failure is often the result. Leaders must understand the interconnectedness of all principles of war. This will allow them to understand the risks they may encounter by omitting one and prompt them to develop mitigating plans.

Leonhard also discusses the fact that Mao Tse-tung was most often on the defensive, but he retained the initiative almost without interruption. (Leonhard, 84) This is a great example of how the principle of offensive applies to groups other than military forces. Mao Tse-tung understood the need to have the people support his causes. If his military forces were not on the offensive, his political forces certainly were.

Historical evidence led Fuller to offer offensive as a principle and it remains valid today. The application of this concept in association with the other principles of war increases the potential for success. It is not sufficient to merely wait for an opportunity to attack because the enemy has made a mistake, or react to an enemy's movement with an offensive action. To be successful, the nation must not be hesitant to act first, to invoke the principle of offensive, to ensure security is maintained. Forces at all levels must take the fight to the enemy, to act offensively and they must understand how the other principles of war work to assist the offensive force in achieving success.

Simplicity

This principle seems to be more difficult to achieve today than in the past. It appears to be near impossible to achieve simplicity when one considers the increased complexity of military plans. The plans need to include the actions of non-governmental organizations, other governmental agencies, diplomatic, economic, and informational issues, joint operations, and include other contributions of militaries from foreign countries. Attempts to put plans together that will address each of these issues become challenging. To further exasperate the issue,

technology has progressed and the introduction of weapon systems that are increasingly difficult to operate continues to grow.

Planners and leaders must put forth the effort to make the plans associated with war look easy. The mission statements must be clear and concise and this will contribute to simplicity by ensuring all will understand them. Striving to keep things simple will facilitate the operation. Simplicity is the keynote to correct planning. It may be increasingly difficult to make things simple as the nation transforms, but it remains the job of the leaders and planners to make things as simple as possible, while also continuing to be thorough and complete.

Indeed, this principle is one that best supports another – the principle of unity of command. Having a multilayered command structure will undoubtedly complicate the organizational structure and lead to misunderstood and incorrect command relationships. As the nation continues to develop coalitions and alliances to fight future struggles, the principle of simplicity must be addressed to ensure there is no confusion of who is setting and maintaining the objectives. Once the structure and objectives are set, it remains imperative that they receive minimal changes for the great enemy of simplicity is vacillation. (Brown, 633) This is not to advocate that there be no changes, but any changes must be absolutely necessary and minimized. Anticipation is important. Planners must put forth the necessary effort to anticipate future issues and address them accordingly. Doing so should make execution of the plans simpler. As Leonhard states, “The intent of this principle, when balanced with other realistic aspects of war, is to encourage clarity of thought and expression.” (Leonhard, 171)

Leonhard also believes the principle of simplicity is no longer valid. He argues that if plans are simple to the user, then they will also be simple to the enemy. He also argues that today's servicemen are highly educated supporting the idea that the principle lacks utility. Most importantly, the principle fails to account for the fact that complexity is a by-product of the pursuit of advantage in war. (Leonhard, 180)

The members of today's services are indeed well educated. The services ensure that the majority of its members have at least a high school education. Many of the members have attended and completed formal training following high school. Almost all officers have degrees and many have graduate level degrees. The military services place heavy emphasis on professional military education and often deny promotions to those who fail to complete the requirements. These educational experiences often lead to ensuring the aptitudes exists in the services that enable members to operate in an environment that may appear complicated because of technological advancements.

The methods of waging war are changing with the changing in technology. The facets planners consider when developing plans and subsequently executing have increased. As stated, these issues complicate the ability to reach the concept behind this principle. So, having higher educated people in the services does not negate the need for the principle, but it certainly helps to achieve the desired results. As Admiral Brown stated, "Operations that are simple to well-trained and indoctrinated forces may seem highly complicated to untrained units." (Brown, 633) The educated members of the services must use their knowledge to provide clear and concise plans that can be thoroughly understood.

This supports the argument that the manner of thinking about the principles must change. The principle of simplicity may have been written to employ the infantry-based armies of the Victorian Age, but the concept, which has been proven in battle, appears to remain valid today. One must now apply it to the computer-based armies of the information age.

Economy of Force

Most classical and modern day theorists have agreed that the concept of the principle of economy of force is valid. Jomini wrote in 1806 that a few fundamental principles govern the conduct of war and that the first of these was to operate with the greatest part of one's forces in a combined effort on the decisive point. (Alger, 153) Modern thought concerning the concept represented here is that: "Economy of force is not only a valid principle of war, it is the most important of those currently accepted within the U.S. armed forces." (Leonhard, 137)

Economy of force is just as it states – the nation and its military leaders need to ensure that minimal forces are allocated to do other missions that are considered secondary in effort. Resources are limited now and will be in the future, but this does not imply that the nation or its military commanders need to be frugal or cheap in the manner they plan to use them. Regional Combatant Commanders know that they have limited resources to apply to the many different situations they may find in their geographical regions. As such, they will need to take calculated risks in secondary areas of importance to ensure that their priority of effort, the situation they deem to be most important, receives the necessary resources to be successful. This has been true in the past and remains valid for the nation's transformation.

In order to apply this concept successfully, the principle of objective must be used. Objectives must be succinctly stated and readily understood (as the principle of simplicity implies). Commanders must take these objectives, analyze them, and develop a plan that maximizes the effects of their available capabilities. Economy of force will play an important role toward the success of the current National Military Strategy of 1-4-2-1. The strategy to fight in two major conflicts, winning one decisively, will depend tremendously on the nation's ability to manage available resources effectively. The leaders will have to apply the principle of economy of force judiciously. This principle is one that should remain valid for years to come.

Surprise

Surprise should be regarded as the soul of every operation. It is the secret of victory and the key to success. It originates in the mind of man and accentuates the power of his will; it is the weapon of intelligence, this harnessing of fear. As direction springs from the mind, so does surprise spring from the sentiments. It has power over moral, and can raise or depress it instantaneously. Panic is never more latent than when one side imagines it has victory by the throat. (Fuller, 273)

It is difficult to find a critic who disagrees with the concept of the principle of surprise. For as Fuller states surprise can certainly lead an offensive force to victory. The principle appears to remain valid today and will probably be valid as transformation continues. Surprise consistently indicates an enemy has been caught off guard. A force has received some type of action that it was clearly unprepared for. A great deal of effort is put into planning for all conceivable types of actions and reactions, so if a force is able to apply this principle in conjunction with other principles, then victory is ever more closer.

In fact one method of achieving surprise is through maneuver. The way a force is able to apply speed of maneuver will keep an opposing force in a reaction mode, and eventually, the speed will find positions where the enemy is unprepared. This surprise is created because the force reached a point in a manner that was much quicker than the opposing force thought possible. Doing so will negatively impact the morale of the opposing force and assist the attacker in obtaining victory.

It is important however, to realize surprise is a two edged sword. Each side desires to surprise the other, and it is the manner in which the surprised force reacts that determines who will be victorious. The attacks on Pearl Harbor and the attacks of September 11, 2001 definitely surprised the United States of America. But, the leaders during both incidents took charge, quickly applied recovery operations, and arranged offensive operations against the attackers. These approaches assisted to regain a high level of moral within the nation. Leaders are responsible for morale and strong, knowledgeable, decisive leaders will work to quickly rebuild any decrease in morale brought on by surprise. Along this line, leaders also know that allowing the forces to be continually surprised breeds discontent. Subordinates will question the leader's ability to lead if surprises continue to occur. It is therefore important for leaders to understand this principle. Leaders need to know that it can work for and against them and should therefore work to eliminate their ability to be surprised while exploiting any capabilities to surprise the enemy.

Some believe that with the information age, surprise will be impossible. The argument suggests that the increase in technology will allow forces to know the other's location. Knowing locations may become a reality, but the information age will generate new opportunities to

exploit the principle of surprise. Leonhard states, “Information warfare will see a constant battle between stealth and data fusion, between knowledge and ignorance, and between truth and deception.” (Leonhard, 193) The information age brings with it new technology which can put the adversary at a disadvantage. The British have proven this during World War II with their use of radars to defeat the German Luftwaffe. (Schneider, 18)

The principle of surprise appears to remain valid but the ability to achieve surprise will continue to be challenging. The information age will bring new and different opportunities, but as the nation desires to address conflicts with coalitions and alliances, gaining trust and building agreeable objectives for all participating nations will not be simple. General Clark discusses how the element of surprise was often compromised during the Kosovo operation. The General had problems with unarmed verifiers and sympathetic Serbs. He also discusses how the public discussions of striking sensitive targets eliminated the element of surprise. (Clark, 424) It is important to realize that as the nation seeks to conduct operations with combined, multinational forces, many of the principles will be challenging. This does not negate the need to address the concepts surrounding the principles, but it will require a very diplomatic, imaginative approach to overcome obstacles. General Clark states that to succeed, he created a process of continuous adaptation, moving from an initial military effort driven by political dynamics toward a more effective military campaign oriented on the principles of war. (Clark, 425)

The concept of surprise can work for and against a force. It is important for leaders to prepare their forces for as many situations as possible. When one is surprised, the leaders must take action to rebuild morale immediately. As the nation transforms into the information age, new

technology will present new challenges as well as new capabilities to achieve the element of surprise. Multinational, rogue operations will develop challenges to the leaders to achieve the concept of the principle, but adaptive leaders will develop methods to overcome such obstacles.

Security

Security will remain viable. As the definition states, the purpose of this principle is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. (JP 3-0, A-2) This concept remains applicable for all levels of war from strategic down to the tactical level. Examples of measures taken by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Regional Combatant Commander to ensure the security of the planning documents for the war in Iraq readily show that security is vital. The United States did not desire to let others become aware of the planning until the nation was ready and fully committed to accomplishing the task being considered. Elements that could have been hostile or simply non-supportive of the actions being planned could have taken preemptive measures that would have either precluded the nation's desires by increasing the risks to undesired levels. The same measures must be taken at tactical levels for similar type reasons.

Critics may argue that with the increase in technology, it is difficult if not impossible to maintain security at a level sufficient to produce surprise. While this may be true, measures are being taken and must continue to progress to provide a secure environment as the military continues its transformation and becomes increasingly dependent on computer networks. These networks that will enable the massing of effects, economy of force, maneuver, and simplicity will also include measures to ensure that the same information is not vulnerable to enemy attack.

The compromise that must be decided upon is to develop security but not to the point of becoming overly cautious. Prudent measures are needed to mitigate risks associated with the tasks of ensuring security.

Leonhard states that security remains a valid principle but needs to be redefined. The new definition is needed because the information age has provided the technology to see the enemy with precision, clarity, and certainty. This ability should lead to a more efficient and economical use of forces normally used for security missions. He also states that attempting to secure everything is equal to total inactivity. (Leonhard, 163)

Leonhard's critical views do address issues that appear valid. During the war against Iraq, forces used technology such as Blue Force Tracker to gain a good understanding of enemy and friendly forces. However, it was not completely reliable as it was based on human input. Nevertheless, it served many well. This system may not be the means to a perfect solution to security concerns for there is the possibility of someone developing a method to input erroneous data. This data could possibly be used to generate "ghost forces" that could create considerable turmoil to offensive and defensive efforts. Leonhard's problem with the idea of security as he sees it is that it lacks balance and does not respond well to the law of economy. It does not balance the need for activity and the need to secure ourselves. (Leonhard, 169) Leonhard is correct that total security would stop all movement. If the nation decided to have total security at air ports or sea ports, then the transfer of goods and people would receive a considerable negative impact. The solution is to address security efforts against threats and not necessarily against vulnerabilities. This again is exactly what the definition states. Security enhances

freedom of action by reducing the opportunity of enemy threats of hostile acts, influence or surprise. (Joint Pub 3-0) If minds are broadened to think in this manner and not solely on how efforts were conducted in the past, then it becomes easier to see how the principle of security remains valid today just as it was in the past. Users of the principle must understand how to reduce the nation's exposure to threats in the most efficient manner.

As the principle of security is considered, one measure that is used to mitigate risks is to go on the offensive. The National Security Strategy discusses the need to act unilaterally and in a preemptive manner when the interest of national security suggests that to do otherwise would not be prudent. The President demonstrated the willingness to do this by attacking the areas where terrorist train and through the attacks on those who harbor or support terrorist activities. The nation will have to continue placing security as a high priority as it continues to transform and to work with the members of the gap and of the core.

The concept of this principle must be understood and the associated risks need mitigating. As shown, to achieve this principle may require offensive actions at times. Also, one must understand that if the desire is to deter an enemy from taking certain actions then one may not desire to secure the knowledge of plan development. For the mere awareness that the nation or a military force is contemplating certain actions may work to provide security – work to ensure the enemy does not achieve an unexpected advantage.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

There have been many discussions on the principles of war and these discussions will continue well into the future. There will be those who support the principles as written, and there will be those who support everything from minor changes to a set of new principles. The information provided here supports the fact that the principles of war as listed in the joint publication stand ready to support the nation as transformation continues. As new types of enemy conditions are being considered, and as new technology is being developed and employed, it is necessary for the leaders to ensure the tried and true concepts presented by the nine principles are maintained. As the nation transforms with technology, so must the manner of thinking by military leaders transform. This new technology must be embraced and exploited by ensuring applications adhere closely to the concepts of these principles. It is not necessary that all concepts are applied to generate success, or is it guaranteed that such application will always produce success. They do provide a starting point for the leaders and planners and all must understand the risks associated with the inability to work within the concepts. The artful use of the principles by strong, competent leaders, who if nothing else, have a solid objective that is supported by the people, will generally produce success.

The principles can be used to guide the manner that the military services will engage in war. They are not meant to be prescriptive, but they exist to assist in the thought process as one prepares to engage or is engaging in combat. One must consider the alternative if such concepts were never codified nor included in service doctrine. Regardless of the academic debates concerning the use of the word principle, the important aspect is how they are presented. One must not merely learn a word such as security or surprise; one must learn how each of the

principles interacts. One must know how they impact upon one another and learn to realize the risks one accepts by foregoing concepts such as those discussed in this paper.

Based on the research, I conclude these terms are not axiomatically immutable. When one considers the magnitude of their importance, to be used during a conflict that involves the lives of many different service men and women, one easily recognizes the need for the principles to be reviewed and debated regularly. The military profession must continue the debates to ensure viability, for consciously or not, they will be used in military operations as demonstrated in every historical example cited.

The research indicates the principles will be used, but there is no order or rule that states they must be used or that if one is used then all nine must be used. Clausewitz states,

Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice. (Clausewitz, 161-162)

No one can reasonably argue with Clausewitz that the fog and friction of war will make it very difficult to fight. The men and women involved in armed conflict will often find themselves in situations where they have to make quick decisions. These decisions will often involve the life or death of their subordinates or their peers, and the enemy. When this occurs, the individual will have to rely on innate talent and the best manner to develop this talent is through thorough training on military doctrine such as the principles of war. The writers of the principles never expected, nor are people expected today, to use a mental checklist to ensure all

principles are considered before taking action. These concepts exist to serve as a guide. They are used to develop the innate talent that allows one to make decisions based on the situation at hand. And these decisions are made without fear of going outside the model, or being in conflict with the model, because the decision-maker knows to weigh the complexity of the situation to arrive at a, hopefully, workable solution. The principles are versatile and guide, not direct. They remain viable as the nation continues its transformation and develops new methods to deal with members of the gap and the core. They have worked to generate success in the past and will work to generate success in the future. As a proven asset, the military professional would be well advised to continue to study and employ these principles. They have not survived without considerable contemplation.

As this research shows, the principles do not require major changes as the military transforms to maximize the use of modern technology. It is my recommendation that the manner that they are thought of must change to understand how new technology can enhance the tried and proven principles of war. Additionally, we must evaluate new technologies to understand how they may enhance or exploit the concepts presented by the existing principles of war.

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APPENDIX A

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

(Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine For Joint Operations)

Objective:

- a. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

- b. The objective of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support accomplishment of the overall political goals of the conflict. This frequently involves the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and their will to fight. The objective of a MOOTW might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objectives.

Mass:

- a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.

- b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

Unity of Command:

- a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

- b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort – coordination through cooperation and common interests – is essential complement to unity of command.

Maneuver

- a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
- b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver – or threaten delivery of – the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

Offense

- a. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
- b. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.
- c. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or re seize the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

Simplicity

- a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
- b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in multinational operations.

Economy of Force

- a. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
- b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

Surprise

- a. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.
- b. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success

well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decisionmaking, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variation in tactics and methods of operation.

Security

- a. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.
- b. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.